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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
VioUi v. Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, [1965] S.C.R. 232.
IMMIGRATION -

DEPORTATION -

HABEAS CORPUS -

DEPORTATION ORDER FOR SPECIFIED PERIOD -

SUSPENSION OF

IMPLEMENTATION OF

ORDER AFTER EXPIRY OF PROBATIONARY PERIOD - IMMIGRATION ACT,
R.S.C. 1952, c. 325, ss. 31, 33, 39 - CANADIAN BILL OF RIGHTS, 1959-

60 (Can.), c. 44.
In Violi v. Minister of Citizenship and Immigration,' the Supreme
Court of Canada delivered an important and desirable decision concerning the scope of discretion vested in the Minister under the
Immigration Act 2 and yet did so without discussing sections 33 and
39 of the Act or the Canadian Bill of Rights, all of which were directly
relevant. The facts of the case can be most conveniently stated as
follows:
(i) Rocco and Guiseppe Violi were admitted to Canada as immigrants in 1958.
(ii) Rocco and Guiseppe were convicted of criminal offences in
1960 and 1961 respectively.
(iii) Following each conviction, an inquiry was held by a Special
Inquiry Officer pursuant to s. 19 (2) of the Immigration Act.3 In each
case an order for deportation was issued, in Rocco's case on February
1, 1961 and in Guiseppe's case on October 16, 1962: appeals from
these orders pursuant to s. 31 of the Immigration Act 4 were both
dismissed, Rocco's on February 20, 1961 and Guiseppe's on November
19, 1962.
(iv) After the dismissal of their appeals, both men received
letters from the Department informing them that the deportation
proceedings had been "suspended"-for twelve months in Rocco's
case and six months in Guiseppe's case. Rocco was informed that
the suspension was "to give you a chance to demonstrate that you
can rehabilitate yourself". He was also informed that "an unfavourable report could mean the carrying out of the deportation order".
Guiseppe was told that "should a further unfavourable report be
received, consideration will be given to proceeding immediately with
your deportation". While both men were required to keep their local
Immigration office informed of their whereabouts, it was only
Guiseppe who received, on May 28, 1963 a letter informing him that
it would be unnecessary for him to report further, other than for
address purposes, and stating that his case had been reviewed.
(v) On April 1, 1964, each of the brothers received letters informing them that it had been decided to implement the deportation
orders made in 1961 and 1962 and they were subsequently taken into
1 [1965] S.C.R. 232, 51 D.L.R. (2d) 506.

2 R.S.C. 1952, c. 325.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
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custody. Their brother, Paoli Violi, then filed a petition for the
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus in respect of his two brothers
who were detained in the Montreal Gaol. On the matter coming before
the Supreme Court of Canada, it was held,5 reversing the Quebec
Court of Queen's Bench, Appeal Side, 6 that Rocco and Guiseppe Violi
were illegally detained. This comment will discuss the Violi decision
from four different aspects.
(i)

S. 33 of the ImmigrationAct

Each court before which the Violi case came was faced with the
the two subsections of section 33 of the Immigratask of reconciling
7
tion Act:
33. (1) Unless otherwise provided in this Act a deportation order shall
be executed as soon as practicable.
(2) No deportation order becomes invalid on the ground of any lapse
of time between its making and execution.

This section appeared in a new form in the 1952 Act and has not
been interpreted in any previous case. The Immigration Act, 19278
had required an alien to be deported "forthwith" after a deportation
order was issued, or after an unsuccessful appeal from such an order.9
The courts subsequently seized upon the word "forthwith" in the
1927 Act to make illegal the suspension of deportation orders for
unreasonable lengths of time, thereby keeping an alien in custody10
1 or thereby prohibiting him from
or under a threat of deportation
acquiring a Canadian domicile. 12
In respect of deportation orders from which an appeal was taken,
the Immigration Act, 1946, dropped the requirement that they be
executed "forthwith" and it was provided that the order "shall not
become invalid on the ground of any lapse of time between its issuance
and execution.' 3 In the 1952 Act, these provisions were extended to
all deportation orders in section 33, and in the Violi case the courts
had the opportunity of explaining whether the pre-1946 decisions
were still relevant and how to reconcile subsections (1) and (2) of
section 33. On these matters, however, the Supreme Court had very
little to say. For the majority, Martland J. said:
I am not prepared to agree that the two deportation orders lapsed because
of the delay which was stipulated in the letters written to Rocco and
Guiseppe Violi. However, s-s. (1) does not contemplate that if a deportas Cartwright, Fauteux, Martland, Richie, Hall and Spence JJ.; Taschereau
C.J.C., Abbott and Judson JJ. dissenting.
6 Bissonette, Rivard and Choquette JJ.; Montgomery and Hyde JJ. dissenting.
7 Supra, footnote 2.
8 R.S.C. 1927, c. 93.
9 Sections 19(2), 33(5), 42(3).
10 Be Btaohow, [19321 2 W.W.R. 698 (Man. K.B.).
11 In re Fereno, [19381 3 W.W.R. 626 (Man. K.B.).
12 By operation of section 2(e) (i) of the Immigration Act, 1927. In re
Immigration Act, in re PoZZ, [19371 3 W.W.R. 136 (Sask. K.B.). Doubt was
cast on these pre-1946 cases by the Supreme Court of Canada in De Marignaj
v. LangZais, [19481 S.C.R. 155, at p. 155, per Kellock J.
13 Immigration Act, S.C. 1946, c. 54, s. 6. In re Wong Jung, [19481 2
W.W.R. 351, 6 C.R. 268, 92 C.C.C. 130 (B.C. S.C.).
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tion order is to be enforced there shall not be undue delay. Subsection (2),
in my opinion, means that lapse of time per se does not result in a
deportation order becoming invalid. In the
4 present case, however, there
is more involved than mere lapse of time.'
We are left in the dark as to what circumstances, combined with
delay, will vitiate a deportation order. Of course, if the officer or
Minister acts ultra vires the Immigration Act,15 that would be a
circumstance which would of itself vitiate a deportation order and
cannot be said to be a circumstance which converts a mere lapse of
time in the implementation of a deportation order into a circumstance vitiating the order. The words of the majority judges give a
general indication that the requirement of section 33(1) is not
mandatory, that it is subservient to section 33(2),16 and that its
breach alone will not invalidate the order. The position of the minority
appears to have been that a delay in the enforcement of an order
cannot now be relevant to its continuing validity, and even if it were
7
relevant, there was not an unreasonable delay in this case.'
In the result, the patent ambiguity of section 33 has not been
resolved and will undoubtedly be the subject of litigation in the future.
(ii)

S. 31(4) of the ImmigrationAct

The majority of the Supreme Court based their decision exclu-

sively on a consideration of s. 31 of the Immigration Act.18 In sub-

stance, this section gives to the immigrant against whom a deportation
order has been made a right of appeal to the Minister of Citizenship
and Immigration 19 who has "full power to consider all matters pertaining to the case under appeal",2 0 to allow the appeal and substitute

his own decision for that of the Special Inquiry Officer, or to dismiss
the appeal. Under s. 31 (4),
The Minister may in any case review the decision of an Immigration
Appeal Board and confirm or quash such decision or substitute his
decision therefor as he deems just and proper and may, for these purposes
direct that the execution of the deportation order concerned be stayed
pending his review and decision and the decision of the Minister on
appeals dealt with or reviewed by him or the decision of the majority
of an Immigration Appeal Board on appeals, other than those reviewed
by the Minister, is final.

The opinion of the majority was that while s. 31(4) permitted
the Minister to make a decision couched in whatever terms he deemed
fitting, once that decision had been made, it could not thereafter be
Supra, footnote 1, at p. 241 (S.C.R.), 524 (D.L.R.).
is As the majority held he had acted in this case. See part (ii) infra.
16 In the Quebec Court of Queen's Bench, Appeal Side, Montgomery J.,
who was the sole judge to rely upon the delay in the enforcement of the
orders as a ground for their invalidity, held that s. 33(1) was mandatory
and that the effect of s. 33(2) was to place "upon the immigrant the burden
of establishing that the delay in his case constituted a violation of s-s. (1)".
(1965), 51 D.L.R. (2d) 506, at p. 511. The majority of the Court, however,
said that the Court could not review the discretion of the Minister with respect
to such delays. Ibid., at p. 517.
17 Supra, footnote 1, at pp. 235-236.
18 Supra, footnote 2.
19 Section 31(2).
20 Section 31(3).
14
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varied or reconsidered. Furthermore, by establishing a probationary
period in the letters to the Violis, the Minister had made his decision
in review under s. 31(4) and had no power further to review the
matter unless there was a breach of probation during the probationary
period. Referring to the letters sent to the Violis after the Minister's
dismissal of their appeals, the majority said:
Having exercised his power of review, under s. 31(4), his decision Is, by
the terms of that subsection, final. This decision was to grant to each of
the persons involved a probationary period. The probationary periods
expired and no step was then taken to enforce the orders. The Minister
did not, thereafter, have power to make a further review and to decide
to extend the probationary period for an additional time....
In my opinion, having made the decision which he did in each case, on
his review of the decisions of the Immigration Appeal Boards, in the
absence of any event occurring during the probationary period which
would have justified his so doing, the Minister did not21thereafter have
the statutory authority to enforce the deportation orders.
In the majority's opinion, the effective decision took place at the
time of the dismissal of the appeal by the Minister. 22 There being no
reprehensible conduct before the end of the probationary period, the
deportation order could not be -enforced either during the probationary
period or afterwards. Nor, it seems, could the order be enforced after
the probationary period ended for mis-conduct by the immigrant
during the period.
This basis for their decision relieved the majority of making the
distinction drawn by the minority. The minority differentiated between a decision by the Minister to quash the Special Inquiry Officer's
decision, subject to a probationary period during which the deportation order could be revitalized if there was misconduct on the part
of the accused, and a decision by the Minister to dismiss the immigrant's appeal subject to reconsideration after the probationary period.
The minority clearly were of the opinion that the Minister's decision
in the present case was of the latter nature and that it was within
the Minister's power to reconsider the matter outside the stated
probation period.23 The majority view appears to be that, whatever
the nature of the Minister's decision, having set the probation period,
he could not reconsider the length of the period nor the substantive
reasons for deportation. 24
On the one hand the decision in the present case can be seen as
an important limitation on the appellate discretion of the Minister
of Citizenship and Immigration under the Immigration Act. An immigrant is now in a position to force the Minister to make an irrevocable
decision on his case, which, combined with the immigrant's right to
bring mandamus proceedings to require the Minister to consider his
21 Supra,footnote 1, at p. 242 (S.C.R.), 525 (D.L.R.).
22 Thus the letter to Guiseppe Violi, informing him that he need not
report to the Immigration office any longer, was of no legal significance, the
effective decision having been made on the Minister's dismissal of the immigrants appeal, when the probationary period was set.
23 Supra, footnote 1, at p. 235 (S.C.R.), 518-519 (D.L.R.).
24 Supra, footnote 21.
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appeal,2 5 substantially eliminates the danger of deportation orders
being suspended indefinitely over the heads of immigrants residing

in this country.
On the other hand, the Department of Citizenship and Immigration has many means of circumventing the decision in the present case.
(1) Apparently, all the Minister need do is rebut the presumption
that the letter announcing the decision of the Minister to the immigrant was an official communication evidencing an actual decision by
the Minister. He may do so by giving evidence in the habeas corpus
proceedings that he did not in fact make a decision quashing the
deportation order or suspending it for a probationary period, but
rather failed to make any positive decision until later when the
deportation order was implemented. The majority of the Supreme
Court said:
I think we are entitled to presume that these were properly authorized
communications, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, and the
only authority for them is the exercise by the Minister of his power to
review the decision of an Immigration Appeal Board under s. 31(4).26
(2) The Minister or Special Inquiry Officer has power to reopen
the inquiry and receive further testimony or evidence, and reverse the
decision previously made.27
(3) The Minister may order a new inquiry and issue a new
warrant for the immigrant's arrest. A new deportation order may
be made after such inquiry28 on, it seems, the same evidence that
29
was tendered at the inquiry leading to the first deportation order.
(4) The Minister may, in his letter announcing the dismissal of
the immigrant's appeal, state that the implementation of the deportation order will be deferred, but not state the duration of the probationary period. Although there is no express power in the ImmigraThe Queen v. Leong Ba Chai, [1954) S.C.R. 10, at pp. 14-15.
Supra, footnote 1, at p. 241 (S.C.R.), 524 (D.L.R.). The minority disagreed. In their opinion, the letters to the Violis were not sufficient evidence
of a decision to quash the deportation orders, subject to a probationary period.
25
26

The dismissal of the Violis' appeals was not negatived by the imposition of
probationary periods, since that was merely a deferral of the execution of a
valid and subsisting deportation order, a deferral which the Minister had
power to order under s. 31(4).
27 Immigration Act, s. 29. Quaere whether an inquiry can be re-opened
after an appeal has been taken to the Minister and dealt with by him under
s. 31. The decision of the Minister on such an appeal is "final" according to
s. 31(4) and the majority in the instant case held that the Minister does not
have power further to review the matter. Does that exclude the right of the
Minister, or Special Inquiry Officer, or majority of an Immigration Appeal
Board to reopen an inquiry to hear further evidence or testimony? It would
seem that the purpose of s. 31(4) is to exclude review by the courts, or by
the Minister of an appealed decision on the evidence and testimony given at
the inquiry and is not relevant to the reopening of an inquiry to deal with
new evidence or testimony. Note, however, that a deportation proceeding may
not be reopened on a previous deportation order that has been quashed by
the court and so ceased to be a deportation order: Bamejima v. The King,
[1932) S.C.R. 640.
28 Immigration Act, sections 15, 17, 19.
29 Samejima v. The King, supra,footnote 27.
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tion Act 30 to suspend the operation of a deportation order, it was
the express opinion of the minority,31 not rejected by the majority,
that the Minister has such a power. 32
(iii)

S. 39 of the ImmigrationAct

S. 39 of the Immigration Act 33 contains a privative clause excluding the jurisdiction of the court
...to review, quash, reverse, restrain or otherwise interfere with any
proceeding, decision or order of the Minister, Deputy linister, Director,
Immigration Appeal Board, Special Inquiry Officer had, made or given
under the authority and in accordance with the provisions of this Act
relating to the detention or deportation of any person, upon any grounds
whatsoever, unless such person is a Canadian citizen or has Canadian
domicile.

The Courts, however, were quick to seize upon the words "given
under the authority and in accordance with the provisions of this
Act" to permit an investigation of any violation of the terms of the
Act. In Samejima v. The King,34 Duff J. said:
In particular the phrase "in accordance with the provisions of this Act"
cannot be neglected; their meaning is plain. The "order" returned as
justifying the detention must be "in accordance with the provisions of
this Act". It must not, that is to say, be essentially an order made in
disregard of some substantive conditions laid down by the Act.35

Since Samejima v. The King, the Court has felt free to investigate
and rule on all manner of legal errors committed in deportation proceedings.3 6 More recently a Quebec court held that, notwithstanding
s. 39 of the Immigration Act, 37 it had jurisdiction to investigate

deportation proceedings to ensure that no civil rights conferred upon
an immigrant by the Canadian Bill of Rights 38 had been violated.3 9
The opinion had previously been expressed, however, that s. 39
was effective to preclude the investigation by a court of a deportation order alleged to be invalid due to tardiness of implementation. 40
This was also the view taken by the majority in the Quebec Court of
Queen's Bench, Appeal Side, 41 and by the minority in the Supreme
Court where Abbott J. said:
30
31
32
33

34
35

Supra,footnote 2.
Supra, footnote 1, at p. 235 (S.C.R.), 519 (D.L.R.).
Subject to those considerations raised in part (i) of this comment.
Supra,footnote 2.

Supra, footnote 27.
Ibid., at p. 641.

36 For example, on a question (a) whether a legitimated child is a "child"
within the meaning of the Immigration Act, R.S.C. 1927, c. 93, s. 38: The
Queen v. Leong Ba Chai, supra, footnote 25; (b) whether persons born in
Trinidad of Asian ancestry were "Asians" within the meaning of Regulation
20(2) passed under the Immigration Act, R.S.C. 1952, c. 325, s. 6(1)(g):
NarineSingh v. Attorney-General of Canada, [1955] S.C.R. 395.
37 Supra,footnote 2.
38 S.C. 1960, c. 44, Part I.
39 Fouche v. Landry, [1960] Que. B.R. 337 (Que. S.C.).
40 In re Eng Jack Wan, [1949] 1 W.W.R. 1133, 93 C.C.C. 283, 8 C.R. 164
(B.C.).
41 Supra, footnote 16, at p. 517.
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In the final analysis the Minister is the only person authorized under the
Act to quash such an order. The courts have no power to do so.4 2

S. 39 was not referred to by the judges in the majority in the
Supreme Court, presumably because their decision that the Minister
had acted without statutory authority in reviewing the deportation
orders after he had dismissed the appeals stripped the Minister of
any protection under s. 39.
(iv)

The CanadianBill of Rights

No mention was made of the Canadian Bill of Rights 3 in the
opinions delivered in the Supreme Court despite the fact that it was
referred to in the decisions rendered in the court below and was
squarely raised by the facts. In Re Rebrin,44 the Supreme Court of
Canada had previously considered the applicability of the Bill of
Rights to proceedings under the Immigration Act, but in that case
the appellant was unable to submit any evidence indicating that her
rights had been infringed contrary to the Bill of Rights. The court
did not specifically decide whether the Bill of Rights was applicable
to deportation proceedings.4 5 More recently in Quebec it has been
held that the Immigration Act must be read subject to the Bill of
Rights and that a court has a right to investigate the deportation
proceedings to determine whether the provisions of the Bill of Rights
have been complied with.46 And in the Violi case itself, in the Quebec
Queen's Bench, Appeal Side, Hyde J. held that if the Department of
Citizenship and Immigration suspended deportation orders conditional
during good behaviour and such orders were invoked without an
opportunity for the immigrant concerned to know in what respect
he had misbehaved since the issuance of the deportation orders, the
Department would be acting in breach of s. 2(a) of the Bill of Rights.4 7
It is true that proceedings under the Immigration Act 48 have
generally been classified as administrative 49 and that there are cases
in which it is stated that the Canadian Bill of Rights is inapplicable
Supra, footnote 1, at p. 235 (S.C.R.), 519 (D.L.R.).
Supra, footnote 38.
(1961), 34 C.R. 412 (S.C.C.).
45 In re Frazer, [1963] 1 C.C.C. 139 (N.S. C.A.) it was expressly left open
whether the Immigration Act was subject to the Bill of Rights, it being the
opinion of the Court that the Bill of Rights could not apply to a deportation
order issued before (but implemented after) the coming into force of the Bill
of Rights.
46 Fouche v. Landry, supra,footnote 39.
47 S. 2 ". . . no law of Canada shall be construed or applied so as to
(a) authorize or effect the arbitrary detention, imprisonment or exile of any
42
43
44

person."
48 Supra,footnote 2.

49 Be Robinson, [1948] O.R. 487 (Ont. H.C.); MameZla v. LangZais, [1955]
S.C.R. 263; per Abbott J.; Ex parte Hirsch, [1960] O.R. 554 (Ont. C.A.).
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to administrative procedure.5 0 It is suggested, however, that the Bill
of Rights itself refutes the contention that it is inapplicable to administrative and more particularly deportation orders. S.2(d) of the Bill
states that the right to counsel, protection against self-incrimination
and other "constitutional" safeguards shall be afforded to persons
appearing before a "court, tribunal, commission, Board or other
authority." S. 2(a) states that "no law of Canada shall be construed
or applied so as to (a) authorize or effect the arbitrary ... exile of
any person". If the word "exile" is to be restricted to the banishment
of Canadian citizens only,51 the rights conferred by the Immigration
Act on Canadian domiciliaries will be limited,5 2 the well established
rule that the immigrant has the same right as anyone else to question,
by habeas corpus proceedings, the validity of his detention under the
Immigration Act,53 will be overturned,5 4 and the "equal protection"
clause of the Canadian Bill of Rights itself will be violated. 55
While there may be a need for a certain amount of discretion
vested in those officers carrying out Department policy under the
Immigration Act, 56 surely the rights afforded the immigrant under
the Act,57 the impact which such an order would have on the rights
of the individual concerned,5 8 the restrictive position the courts have
taken with respect to s. 39 of the Act 59 -removing any discretion of
the Department in matters of law-and the terms of the Canadian
50 Ex parte McCaud, [1965] 1 C.C.C. 168 (S.C.C.). Application for habeas
corpus contesting the right of a Parole Board to revoke the applicant's parole
under the Parole Act, S.C. 1958, c. 38, which provides in s. 8(d) that "this
Board may ... revoke parole at its discretion". Held: as the granting or
revoking of parole is an administrative matter and is not in any way a
judicial determination, the Bill of Rights did not apply. See also Guay v.
Lafleur, [1965] S.C.R. 12, 51 D.L.R. (2d) 226, where the Bill of Rights was
held to be inapplicable to proceedings in an income tax inquiry which can
result in no decision or adjudication and is therefore administrative.
51 The connotation of "exile" is forced removal from one's own country:
Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary (1956) defines "exile" as "forced, or
sometimes voluntary removal from one's country".
52 Immigration Act, sections 3, 4, 39.
53 Supra, footnote 2.
54 Vaaro v. The King, [1933] S.C.R. 36, 59 C.C.C. 1, [1933) 1 D.L.R. 359;
subject, of course, to the Immigration Act itself.
55 The Canadian Bill of Rights, supra,footnote 38, s. 1. "It is hereby recognized and declared that in Canada there have existed and shall continue to
exist without discrimination by reason of race, national origin, colour, religion
or sex, the following human rights, and fundamental freedoms, namely,...
(b) the right of the individual to equality before the law and the protection
of the law." Quaere, whether s. 39 of the Immigration Act, considered in part
(iv) of this casenote, offends against s. 1(b) of the Canadian Bill of Rights?
56 Supra, footnote 2.
57 The right to be present (and represented by counsel) at an inquiry
ordered before possible deportation: s. 27; right to appeal to the Minister
or Immigration Appeal Board: s. 30; the burden of proof is apparently on
the Department when the immigrant is already in Canada: s. 27(4).
58 In this connection, note Ridge v. Baldwin, [1964] A.C. 40 in which the
House of Lords appears to have adopted the degree to which a decision could
affect the rights of the individual concerned as the test to determine whether
such a decision is judicial in so far as requiring the adjudicator to adhere to
the rules of natural justice. Also, in G-uay v. Lafleur, supra, footnote 50, the
Supreme Court of Canada appears to have been influenced by the fact that
no decision affecting the rights of the taxpayer is given by the inquiry officer
in arriving at the conclusion that an income tax inquiry is an administrative
proceeding.
59 See supra,part (iii) of this comment.
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Bill of Rights itself, all lend credence to the view that the discretion
accorded these officials is to be restricted, perhaps not within the
absolute terms of the Bill of Rights, but within some limited area
determined by a balancing of the purposes of the Immigration Act 60
and the Bill of Rights. 6 1 However, if the Supreme Court is of the
opinion that the subjection of an immigrant to the threat of a suspended deportation order for a long period of time and its eventual
implementation against him without him being given an opportunity
to know in what respects he has misbehaved since the deportation
order was suspended does not constitute a violation of his rights to
"life, liberty, security and the right not to be deprived thereof except
by due process of law", 62 his right "to be informed promptly of
64
the reason for his . . . detention", 63 or his right to a "fair hearing",
65
nor effects his "arbitrary detention, imprisonment or exile", it is
nevertheless submitted that the issue is not so clear as to warrant
the complete avoidance of the Canadian Bill of Rights in a case in
which its application was squarely raised by the facts.
THOMAS G. HEINTZMANW

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
In re The Supreme Court Act Amendment Act, 1964 (B.C.); The A.-G.
of British Columbiav. McKenzie, [1965] S.C.R. 490.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-PROVINCIAL LEGISLATION CONFERRING DIVORCE
JURISDICTION ON LOCAL JUDGES OF SUPREME COURT-WHETHER ULTRA
VIRES AS INTERFERING WITH FEDERAL POWER UNDER B.N.A. ACT, 1867,

ss. 91, 92, 96, 101.
This case was an appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada under
section 37 of the Supreme Court Act' from a unanimous decision of
the British Columbia Court of Appea 2 which held, on a reference
under the Constitutional Questions Determination Act,3 that section 3
2.
61 Supra, footnote 38. For a review of the balance that the American
courts have sought to achieve between the Fifth Amendment of the Federal
Constitution and the American Immigration laws, see Selected Essays on
Constitutional Law (1930), published under the auspices of the Association
of American Law Schools, Book IV, pp. 739 et seq.
62 Canadian Bill of Rights, supra, footnote 38, s. 1(a). See I. R. Rand,
Except by Due Process of Law (1960-63), 2 Osgoode Hall L.J. 171.
Canadian Bill of Rights, supra,footnote 38, s. 2(c).
60 Supra, footnote

64 Ibid., s. 2(e).
65 Ibid., s. 2(a).
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